(m. Dulle luigniz za Conquescoial committee. 19325.)

LOUGHE AT SOFTET PROX VASHERYON

The Seviet regime is securely entremelted in power, and its control remains thereugh and apparently effective.

Although there are probably rivalries and disagreements within the ruling group, they have not seriously affected Seviet determination.

DOTTOES TRIAL

The Dectars plot and the other charges of conspiracies—about which you have been reading in the newspapers may indicate current conflicts within the Polithure or merely a general feeling of insecurity.

We may see the rubbless extermination of all minerity elements conteminated by contact with the West. The AstiSenstic expect of this development is definitely secondary within the Seviet Union.

Soviet control over the European Satellites is now virtually complete. Popular discontent may persist, but this alone will probably not impeds the Soviet program.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010099-4

Security Information

- 2 -

Unlike the European Satellites, the Chinese Communist government is more a paramer than a slave of the Kremlin. It has firm control over mainland China, had this control will probably not be threatened from within.

Soviet military strength is formidable. It has an every of 2,500,000 man; a new, of 300,000; an eds force of 750,000.

The common which keeps this military structure and the Seviet state machine together is a security force of \$100,000. Seviet military strungth will increase. A medernization program is undersay. Special emphasis is being placed on weapons of mass destruction and upon defense against such weapons.

By mid-1955, the USER may have several handred atomic books; tegether with improved methods for delivering these books against the F. S. and its allies. Seviet air defenses, already substantial, will further improve.

In the European Satellites and in Communist China, programs for the improvement of military strength are also going forward.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ECRTRDP79B00970A000100010099-4

strices. He estimate that in 1951 the gross national product of the USER was 20 to 30 percent above the proter level. It is now increasing at an annual rate of 6 to 7 percent. In 1951, however, the combined gross national product of all Soviet Bloc countries was still less than one-third that of MATO coestries, and the gross national product of the Soviet alone was about one-fourth that of the U.S.


The Seviet economy is emperimed with a view to possible hostilities in the near fature as well as in the more remote future. The Kreelin places a high priority upon stockpiling reserves, not only of military end-items but of food, capital equipment, and materials needed for maintaining the economy under wartino conditions or other emergencies.

The USSR is also engaged in a large-scale research and development program. This includes especially extende energy, electronics, jet aircraft, guided missiles, and submarines. In all of these fields, Soviet scientists and technicians have descentisted a high level of profitiency.

25X6A

PRIZ KORLO

In the free world, Hestern European political and economic strongth will probably increase. However, progress temard a self-sufficient and militarily defensible Western Europe will still be beset by memorous political 25X6A and economic problems.



25X6A

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010099-4

Security Information

-5-

In France, economic and political instability appears likely to continue for some years to come, and, as a result, France will almost certainly be unable to meet its current MaTO consituents while simultaneously maintaining a major effort in Indomina.

In Italy, the present committee, led by the Christian Descrite, is likely to min the 1953 elections by a narrow margin, but Italy will probably not be able to develop quickly sufficient economic or political strength to be anything more than a weak ally.



25X6A

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010099-4

Security Information

-6-

In the Middle Rest and in North Africa, developing nationalism is a disruptive influence. Demands for political and social reform are increasing. In most of these countries (except possibly Iran), dominates as such is not likely to become a serious threat during the next for years; invertheless, a gradual and evolutionary political change some unlikely. Developments will probably be uneven and spansedic and will probably be enough depart, assessing tions, and other revolutionary processes, accompanied by increasing authoritarismism.

In Egypt a revolutionary good detect under the suspices of young anny officers has displaced the traditional ruling class. Although strongly nationalistic, the new group appears hemest, emergetic, and genuinally intent upon building a new and better society. They have recently reached an accord with the UK on the Sudan and this is only one of a number of indications that they are prepared to cooperate with the West. It is still unclear, however, whether the present medicate leaders can retain control over the military junta, shether they can cope with the traditionally dominant reactionary elements, and whether they can make sufficient progress in solving Egypt's social and economic problems to prevent distillusionment. They may be our last clumes.

Approved For Release 200 (05008) EDP79B00970A000100010099-4

Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010099-4

- 7 -

the situation is now very democrous. During the last few days, events have brought a number of disturbing elements into feets, and this may be preliminary to a final disintegration. There are reports that Prime Minister Messadeq is giving up hope of reaching an oil settlement with the British. He may recommend the sale of oil to anyons, including the Seviet orbit. At the same time, the Iranian army is having trouble with local tribes. Although this is not the first time in the past two years when Iran's collapse seemed instance, the situation now appears more dishearbening than at any time in the immediate past. Even though the present situation may improve, instability is likely to continue and a Communist seizure of power will remain a possibility.

In French Morth Africa, growing nationalism conflicts with French determination to retain central. French
consessions to Merth African nationalism probably will forestall
serious trouble for the mext several years, but the nationalists
will remain unsatisfied. Frence itself is acutely sware that
without North Africa she will be gravely meakened; severtheless
she will eventually have to make some new arrangements with
Moreoco and Tunisia or be faced with increasingly costly repression.

East as a whole is likely to remain week. Because of suspicions of Neetern motives and rivalries within the area, it will be difficult to establish a Middle East defense organization. Even if this organization is astablished, the countries of the area will be unable to contribute significant forces to its support, and they will continue to resist the stationing of Western forces in their territories.

In the Fer East, the mapid postume expension of Communist influence appears to have slackened, at least temperarily. Some non-Communist governments have increased in strength and stability. However, the area remains vulnerable to further Communist explicitation because of the midespread sentiment against "Western imperialism," the desire for improved scenarios status, and the ineffective leadership of most non-Communist Far Eastern governments.

and military stelements. We decinive shift in the ballance is likely in the foresoccable future. The French military affort in that country constitutes a heavy drain on the remourement of netropolitan france. We bulliave that the French will continue their commissent in Indochine at approximately the present level, but will attempt to transfer to the U.S. the burden of any increasing costs or additional effort.

In Kerea, the Communists are capable of lapaching a large-scale offensive virtually mithout warning.

We believe that the Communists will pretract the analytics
negotiations so long as they consider that they can tentions
to gain political and military advantages from the situstion in Kerea and so long us they estimate that a continuation
of the Kerean war does not involve grave risk of global
war. Even if an armistics is conducted, Kerea will almost
containly remain an area of grave danger, and the object of
intensive Communist political warfare.

Approved For Release 2007/08/08-RDP79B00970A000100010099-4

Security Information

25X6A

- 10 -



25X6A

25X6A

In latin America, the traditional secial order is disintegrating. This process has preduced political instability more preferred than that which in the past characterized the personal politics of latin America. The political transits toward extremely nationalistic regime based on support by the deprecased masses, of which the Feren regime in Argendan is the pretetype. The Commutate, though measurically wask, specularly writing through various fronts, due readily exploit the social except and ultre-nationalism already existing in the non-Gomennist population. Both Commutate and extreme nationalists are sebetaging latin American cooperation with the United States.

- 11 -

LOCKING AT WEST PROB SOVIET

How, I shall place specif in the Kremlin and look at the world situation from Hosees. From these I could view with satisfaction the great increase in the strength of the Seviet Flor since World War II. Neverthaless, the Kremlin almost containly estimates that general war would be a gashle, haveleng at a minimum widespread destruction in the Blog and the risk that the Kremlin's system of control would be destroyed.

ton the station

- 12 -

The Kremlin almost certainly recognizes:

That the states of Western Durope are now more stable than at any time since World Wer II.

That the position of most men-Communist states in Asia is susuchat stronger than in 1950.

That progress has been made termed the unification and reassument of Western Europe and termed improving the West's defenses in the Pacific.

That the U. S. has made great strides toward developing its economic and military power and toward providing landauship for the West.

improver, the Exemilia must assume that the nest is making rapid progress in the development and production of new weapons.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA EDP79B00970A000100010099-4

- 13 -

Henry, despite these ingresses in the sirength of the free world, the Emmlin almost certainly estimates that epperbunities remain for continued progress toward its long-range objective (namely, a Communist world dominated by Mosow) without resert to general war. It probably estimates, for example, that:

The economics of the non-Communist states are highly vulnarable to depression and inflationary extens, which would have serious senial and political reparameters.

Western political unity will be understood by such developments

25X6A

products into expert markets now deminated by other states, and conflicting tariff and trade policies.

Opportunity exists for expliciting discentent and nationalist aspirations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

25X6A

-11-

The Kremiin alms t certainly estimates that the divergent interests of the Bestern Powers will somer or later weaken or destroy their procent unity. It probably also believes that no intermitical expanisation which does not have the centralized leadership and central which the USER provides the Bloc can survive the strains and pressures of molern political werfere.

to undermine and destroy the non-Communist world by cold war tection. The Communists will report to seemed aggression and to armed revealt by indigenous Communist parties when they balieve these courses of action are the best means to achieve Communist objectives. If the growth of free world strength and unity continues, however, the Communists will probably place greater emphasis upon "united front" tection and upon prepagands and diplomatic moves designed to split the Western allies and to promote dissension within non-Covist countries.

Thus, great denger to the free world during the period of this estimate will lie is political and equipment difficulties and divisions within the free world itself which would check the development of free world unity and strength and lend themselves to Communist exploitation.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010099-4

while the widespread four of imminust global was has lessened, the Soviet leaders have not moderated their heatility toward the free world. So general settlement between the Bloc and the free world is in prespect, nor any substantial Soviet concessions. It nor indications of weekness have appeared in the Soviet Bloc; on the contempy it grows stronger. The Kreelin continues to expect an ultimate victory over the capitalist world.

We believe it unlikely that the Kramlin will deliberately initiate general war during the period of this estimate. However, there will be continuing grave danger that general war may arise from a series of actions and counteractions in a situation which raither side desired to develop into general war.